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Article 1

Letters to the Editor. . .
(Note: The lournal of the American Medical
Association (lAMA) refused to print the
following letter.

To the Editor:
In her recent article (lAMA, Oct. 21,
1992) Dr. Stotland attempts to argue that
post-abortion trauma is a "myth" and
factually "non-existent". Clearly, more unbiased and expanded empirical studies need
to be conducted in this area before the issue
can be satisfactorily resolved. I am not a
trained psychiatrist. However, as a former
biomedical researcher and present philosopher and bioethicist, I would like to suggest
one possible source of Dr. Stotland's denial of
such a trauma - i.e., the denial (by many of us)
of the actual status of what it is that is aborted.
It would seem that this is critical to any factual
understanding of adverse reactions (however
psychiatry would categorize them) several
years after the abortion event. I applaud Dr.
Stotland's desire to "bring the discussion into
the scientific medical literature", yet there
must be an unbiased effort to be truthful and
consistent in acknowledging in that literature
what are "facts" and what are "myths".
Many of us have been thoroughly convinced by the scientific (and the bioethics)
literature itself (before the fact of abortion)
that the human embryo or human fetus is
either not a human being, or if it is, that it is
not a human person.' If either is factually the
case, the decision of a woman to abort or not
to abort her unborn child is a priori made
considerably more justifiable and "rational".
Elaborate scientific arguments have been
flooding the biomedical literature for some
years now, positing such scientific claims as:
the human embryo or human fetus is just a
"blob" or piece ofthe mother's tissues; that all
of the genetic information specific for a
human being is not present at fertilization;
that human embryos can give rise to
teratomas or hydatidform moles and there-
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fore are not "human";2 that all of the cells
from the 5-6 day embryo trophoblast layer
are discarded after birth and therefore it is
really a "pre-embryo", that totipotent cells
can each develop into later individual human
beings, and that twinning can not take place
after 14 days - and therefore the early
human embryo is not a true "individual", and
therefore not a true human being yet;3 that full
differentiation is completed by 14 days;· and
that true "personhood" is not present until
"brain-birth", i.e., the formation of the nervenet, neocortex or whole brain integrating
system.s
If such "medical facts" (and others like
them) were actually true, it is small wonder
that not only young teen-age girls and
younger women, but also boy friends,
husbands, parents, grandparents, priests, ministers and counselors, physicians, nurses,
researchers, public policy makers, Supreme
Court Justices - and yes, even psychiatrists
- have bought into such "scientific" claims
which are really, themselves, in fact "myths"
and "non-existent." Surely such scientific
misinformation has bolstered at least temporarily their firm convictions that the early
human embryo or human fetus is not really a
human being or a human person, and
therefore disposable or insignificant in contrast to the autonomous rights of "women
who become pregnant under problematic
circumstances." Unfortunately, these "scientific facts" in the biomedical literature are all
incorrect; yet I do not hear Dr. Stotland
calling for an objective purging of these
"myths" from the biomedical literature in the
name of scientific accuracy and the physicianpatient relationship.
To determine if the human embryo is a
human being, all one has to do is count the
number of chromosomes under a microscope,
and observe the functions and activities which
are present immediately after fertilization.
The real scientific facts are the following.

3

The early human embryo and human fetus is
not a "blob" or piece of tissue of the mother.
When the 23 chromosomes of the sperm and
the 23 chromosomes of the ovum are
combined (by the end of fertilization), a new,
unique living individual with 46 chromosomes (the number and quality specific for the
human species)6 is formed. Although this
means that the human embryo is a human
being, the chromosomal make-up of the
human embryo and fetus is qualitatively
different from that of either the mother or the
father. That is, the genetic identity of the
human embryo is different from the genetic
identity of the tissues of the mother. The
embryo is already a male or a female;
immediately specifically human enzymes and
proteins are formed; specifically human
tissues and organs will be formed.? Virtually
all of the genetic information the human being
will ever have or need is present immediately
at fertilization. No genetic information is
gained or lost throughout development only the use of some information is lost
through mechanisms such as methylation.8
This original genetic information "cascades"
throughout the course of human development, determining later molecular information, tissue and organ formation;9 and it
includes the genetic information needed for
differentiation,1O totipotency (which is quite
normal) and all of the processes of embryogenesis - sometimes even twinning. Entities
such as teratomas and hydatidiform moles do
not arise from genetically normal human
embryos, but from abnormal embryos to
begin with (e.g., dispermy)." All of the cells
from the trophoblast layer are not all
discarded after birth, but many from the yolk
sac and allantois are incorporated into the
embryo-proper as the early blood cells and
the primordium of the primitive gut, and in
the human adult as the median umbilical
ligament and blood cells. 12 Twinning is
possible after 14 days, e.g., with fetus-in-fetu
and Siamese twins.13And there is no scientific
physiological basis for a valid parallel
between "brain death" and "brain birth",
sentience or self-consciousness.14 Full human
development is not complete until after 20
years of age,15 and full brain integration and
the actual exercising of "rational attributes"
are not present until several years after birth.16
Thus any arguments about physiological
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"preconditions" for either sentience or rational
attributes are themselves arguments from
potentiality, and actually depend physiologically on the precondition of the single-cell
human zygote itself. If either actual sentience
or rational attributes are the rationale for
human "personhood", then newborns, young
children, Alzheimer's and Parkinson's patients,
alcoholics, drug addicts, the mentally ill and
depressed (to name but a few) are not
"persons" either, and thus, by the same logic,
could be "disposed of'.
The position that the early human embryo
and human fetus is not a human being or a
human person, then, is itself scientifically and
medically a "myth". Such incorrect medical
information should be brought out into the
"light" of professional scientific scrutiny as
well as any information concerning the
"myth" of post-abortion trauma. Yet how
many physicians, or psychiatrists, are willing
to "provide [this] sound scientific information
[to their patients] to help them make informed
decisions about health issues"? Not many.
Yes, Dr. Stotland is correct to note the
increase in the conflict concerning abortion,
especially since the Roe v Wade decision. But
she implies that religious and personal
opinions which reject abortion are factually
misplaced and are being imposed on women
who have the absolute autonomous right to
choose whatever they want in regard to their
unborn child. She also implies that these
irrational (because personal and/ or religious)
claims about post-abortion trauma are hampering the physician's and the psychiatrist's
role to "counsel, advocate for, and treat
individual patients on the basis of medical
knowledge and in the patient's best interest".
Yet Dr. Stotland refuses to consider that
perhaps some personal opinions and some
religious convictions are rooted in nonrelative, objective facts. For example, the
human embryo and the human fetus are
human beings. Perhaps the correct embryological facts are obtained years after the
abortion. Or perhaps the woman eventually
puts two + two together in some other way.
That correct information, coupled with a
religious commitment to respect all innocent
human beings (regardless of their race, sex,
nationality - or size) could conceivably
trigger such a "traumatic" event in the mother
who has previously naively aborted what she
thought at the time was just a "blob" of her
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own tissue. If she has also donated her aborted
unborn child for fetal tissue transplant
research, perhaps she could also come to the
realization of another medical "fact" - that
her fetus was not dead or anesthesized when
his or her brain cells were removed for such
"therapy". These medical "facts" should also
be constitutive of any realistic physicianpatient counseling - and yet they are not.
A woman could also come to the gradual
realization that a woman's - or any other
human being's - "pure autonomy" is also a
"myth". Certainly the field of bioethics is
beginning to come to grips with that dialogue.
No one - male or female - has an absolute
right to choose anything, just because
conditions are difficult or a mistake was
made. Our choices are always qualified; and
we must all live with the consequences of our
"choices". Again, Dr. Stotland refuses to
consider that she is - in fact - medically
treating two patients when she is counseling
about abortion - the mother and her unborn
child. If there is such a thing as post-abortion
trauma, to counsel for abortion could in the
long run be counter-productive to the "best
interests of the mother" - not to mention the
best interests of her unborn child - who is a
human being right from the start.
Finally, I respect Dr. Stotland's concern
about what has come to be identified as a
"woman's issue". I myself am a professional
woman, and I know perfectly well that
women have been the subject of serious and
unjustified abuse and discrimination. However, this does not condone the current
"rationalization" and legalization of everything and anything, simply because many
women "want" it. Abortion is, in fact,
ultimately an aggression against women. The
sooner women acknowledge that fact the
sooner more realistic counseling of women in
"problematic" situations can be provided by
physicians and psychiatrists alike. Dr. Stotland
should not be so selective about which "facts"
to explore in the biomedical literature. Nor
should she be so quick to selectively accept as
"facts" things which are in fact "myths".

-Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D.
Assistant Prof. Philosophy/Bioethics
Department of Philosophy
DeSales School of Theology
Washington, D.C. 20017
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To the Editor:
There is a seriouS fault to Mark A.
Johnson's argument in his article, "The
Principle of Double Effect and Safe Sex in
Marriage: Reflections on a Suggestion"
(Linacre Quarterly, May 1993). The omission is not only curiously large, but undermines the foundation of his argument,
namely, that the use of condoms to prevent
disease transmission in marriage is morally
wrong because the directly intended act is the
same as in contraception. The directly
intended act, according to Dr. Johnson, is
blocking the deposition of semen into the
vagina, which is the purpose of marital
intercourse.
Dr. Johnson forgets that marriages are
made up of two people, either of whom could
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be infected with the AIDS virus. Indeed,
Earvin "Magic" Johnson, the charismatic
spokesman of the deplorable "Safe Sex"
campaign, swears that he was infected by a
woman. (I use the example of Arthur Ashe,
another sports celebrity, to remind readers
that even chaste, virtuous people are susceptible to the virus through a variety medical
mishaps.)
How, then, do the principles of double
effect apply to cases where the infected
marriage partner is a woman? In these cases,
disease prevention is pursued by preventing
infected vaginal secretions from infecting
penile skin. The directly intended goal in
using a condom is thus not contraceptive. I
propose that in these cases, the four principles
of the double effect are met:

1. The directly intended object of the act
-blocking virally infected vaginal secretions
from penetrating penile skin - is not
contradictory to moral law.
2. The use of the condom is intended to
prevent infection of the husband by the
wife, not the prevention of semen entering
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the vagina. The action of contraception is
thus only indirectly intended.
3. The beneficial effect of not transmitting a
fatal disease to the husband is at least as
great a good as contraception is a wrong.
4. The beneficial and deleterious effects are
, both immediately related to the use of a
condom.
My analysis of this problem leaves us with
the tenuous moral position of saying that
condoms are an acceptable means of disease
prevention in marriages where the wife is
infected with the AIDS virus, but not when
the husband is infected. I hope that these
remarks will add completeness to Dr.
Johnson's remarks, as well as encourage
further discussion of this important topic.
Perhaps some other reader will be able to
meld these two judgements into a simple,
consistent, and universally applicable moral
principle.
-

Gregory J. Kenney
Creighton University School of
Medicine
Omaha, Nebraska
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